Understanding the Papua Conflict and Figuring Out Possible Solutions
Conflict and violence in Papua have become a complicated issue that lasted for decades, which has arguably not been resolved until now. The roots of violence and conflict in Papua (or West Papua, as some people know) need to be traced back to the history of Papua (genealogy of violence) since the decolonization process.
Indeed, development and conflict resolution in Papua is a shared responsibility, not only from the perspective of Jakarta but also Jayapura.
Do not be ignorant: Papua’s past with Indonesia is not a smooth sail
The collection of unfortunate past events such as bloody Wamena (2000), bloody Abupera (2000), and bloody Paniai (2014) carried out by Indonesian security forces as well as Military Operations in Nduga (2018), and Intan Jaya at the end of 2019 has not yet been resolved until now. On the other hand, rape, shootings, and killings conducted by pro-independence groups, commonly called rebels, KKB, KSP, or TPN-OPM, whose cases go hand in hand with those bloody incidents above are easy to be traced and witnessed.
During 2019, for example, 154 complaints had been submitted to the head of the National Commission on Human Rights representative in Papua, Frits Ramanedey, and he mentioned that the number is more than the previous year. In 2015 there were 103 complaints. In 2016 there were 124 complaints. In 2017 there were 89 complaints, and in 2018 only 68 complaints submitted to the institution.
Efforts to stop conflict and violence in Papua are and will never be easy. It needs to be done with total hard work and meticulous strategies involving all parties, including the central and provincial governments and other non-formal actors in both levels too.
In the book of Papua Road Map, Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present, and Securing the Future, the Research Team from LIPI (2008) reveals four sources of conflict in Papua.
First, the marginalization and discrimination felt by indigenous or native Papuans because of economic development, cultural policies, and mass migration in Papua from 1970 to the present day. Second, the failure of Papuan development that has not yet succeeded in providing tangible welfare. Third, the contradiction in understanding the historical integration and construction of political identity between Papua and Jakarta. The last, a long history of political violence in Papua, especially conflicts between the security forces and Papuan extremist groups.
Indonesian nationalists who believe in the final integration of Papua within Indonesia see that today’s Papua is the final political principle and format. This position, on the contrary, is never legit according to Papuan nationalists, because “the nation and state of Papua have been established since 1 December 1961”. Hence, they demand the return of “sovereignty and independence” of Papua.
Experts try to map the actors in the tangle of the Papua problem (LIPI, 2003). First, there are nationalist groups such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Papua Desk of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the TNI-POLRI, and other state agencies. Besides, there are also various paramilitary groups and ‘Task Forces’ associated with certain religious organizations and certain military units.
Second, actors from the Papuan pro-independence circles such as the National Liberation Army/Free Papua Organization (TPN/OPM) as well as other Papuan nationalist groups scattered at home and abroad such as the KNPB and AMP. Lately, the local NGOs like Fri-WP also appeared in the constellation of the issue of Papua.
Between the two poles, there are the Papua Customary Council (DAP), religious institutions (the Catholic and Protestant Churches, and other religious institutions), NGOs, political parties, social organizations, and tribal-based groups in Papua. If the map of the Papuan political elites is also included, the chaotic dynamics are increasingly visible.
All of this shows that there are so many actors and political arenas that actually make the Papua issue is not as simple as a battle between two poles. Nevertheless, such a simple approach is always made up.
Indonesian nationalists labeled the gray group also part of the ‘separatist group.’ On the other hand, with the same logic but for different political purposes, Papua nationalists also tend to suspect the gray groups as ‘pro-Jakarta.’
Total efforts from both poles to maintain their respective positions only, in the end, perpetuate the history of conflict and violence in the land of Papua. Both sides certainly need to find ways to end violence and conflict and try to build lasting peace in the land of Papua. For this reason, this paper tries to provide some recommendations for consideration.
First, the people of Papua need to obtain historical justice. Historical facts show that the process of decolonization and the integration of Papua into Indonesia did not proceed smoothly. Some solutions can be chosen for immediate implementation, including giving restitution, repatriation, compensation, rehabilitation, forming a truth commission, and formally apologizing. It is not an easy action, of course, but this will be a crucial first step.
Second, memoria passionis (spirit) of Papuans has spread all over the world. Past human rights violations in Papua can no longer be covered up with only a variety of slogans such as defending the country, the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, and other slogans. Therefore, the Indonesian civil and military apparatus need to catch up with the adoption of these human rights values. Of course, we cannot force it to be done fast because if we observe the West, they need centuries to adopt these values. Indonesia cannot take several centuries to find such a resolution, of course. As long as all relevant actors will work hard, we just need principle-based acceleration, not to ‘reinvent the wheel.’
Third, the reconstruction of Papuan identity. Through their various traditional institutions, Papuans themselves have categorized their racial identity as a Melanesian nation (the most dominant race), this must be admitted by various groups. Furthermore, crafting and nurturing a Melanesian Indonesian identity can undoubtedly be a valuable effort that can be promoted. Several other groups have tried to visualize this kind of thing, for example, Muslim Indonesian, Chinese Indonesian, Malay Indonesian, etc.
Peace and development
Every policy and program in Papua must pay attention to two key words, namely peace and development. On the basis of the proper understanding, it is necessary to formulate strategies and policies that are integrative and holistic, mainly because of the multi-aspect, multi-stakeholder and multidimensional problems in Papua.
However, at the level of implementation program, Papua requires a more specific approach by paying attention to local wisdom, including communication approaches with various indigenous Papuan groups, both in the form of public consultations and customary forums.
The development and peace approach in Papua must be able to create ownership and responsibility for the programs offered, build mutual trust to reduce disparities, and increase the confidence of Papuans as an equal part of Indonesian society.
All the existing policy formulations that have been made by various government departments are arguably quite good, but in its implementation, there has not been strong coordination between them. The Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Security of Indonesia, Mahfud MD explained that the government is no longer making new policies. As compensation, they will take a welfare approach and strengthen coordination between ministries in solving this problem. (Tirto, 2019). If these all could be executed well and expeditiously, in my humble opinion, all difficulties in Papua can be resolved immediately.
Based on the descriptions above, it should be made clear that the development and resolution of conflicts in Papua is a joint responsibility both from the Indonesian government and from the Papuans themselves by highlighting mutual trust. The Indonesian government must work hard and the people of Papua must be open. As a result, all parties will work together for progress in Papua.
The future of Papua is in the hands of Papuans
Nowadays, all regional administrators in Papua and West Papua Provinces (West Papua) are native Papuans. The top leaderships are indigenous Papuans, not only from the civil field but also from the field of security and military. All governors, regents, and mayors are indigenous Papuans. They have full power to create initiatives and policies in various fields ranging from business, social to politics.
With the current vast establishment of power in the hands of native Papuans, all efforts to improve the welfare of Papua as well as strengthen the identity and dignity of Papuans have largely become also the responsibility of Papuans themselves. Efforts to obtain historical justice, enhance human rights values, and strengthen a Papuan identity are also part of the collective duties of Papuans.
Efforts to obtain historical justice and strengthening the values and principles of human rights can be initiated by the local governments of Papua and West Papua to organize multicultural and multi-professional forums. For example, at the forum representatives of civilian apparatus, military, educators, community leaders, and religious leaders are actively exchanged views. With government support, this multicultural and multi profession discussion can be a driving factor for social welfare in Papua.
It can be argued that a vast part of the power to reconstruct and develop Papua along with the future of Papuan welfare now is in the hands of leading native Papuans, even though demands on Jakarta to pay for past mistakes are still necessary. The question now, though, is, to what extent are the top policymakers in Papua who are indigenous Papuans willing to exercise their authority and power to improve the welfare of the people of Papua (Papua and West Papua)? Time will tell.
Annalia
